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RESTITUTION FOR MONEY PAID UNDER
MISTAKE OF LAW
Restitution1 has been defined as the grouping together of the
common law quasi-contract and the corresponding right to equitable
relief to prevent unjust enrichment.2 This concept is embodied in the
Restatement of Restitution section 1: "A person who has been un-justly enriched at the expense of another is required to make resti-
tution to the other." As a general rule, in order to establish the
right to restitution, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has
received a benefit from the plaintiff, and that the retention of the
benefit by the defendant is unjust.3
If A has made a payment by mistake to B, one of the factors
involved in determining if A may recover the payment is whether the
mistake was one of fact or of law. If the mistake was one of fact, as
a general rule the payment may be recovered.4 If the mistake was
one of law, as a general rule the payment may not be recovered.5
The purpose of this paper is to examine this distinction as it has
been applied in California; to determine if it is valid in light of
underlying policy factors; and, if the distinction proves unsound, to
suggest remedial legislation. At the outset it is necessary to be
aware of the following:
It must always be borne in mind, in cases denying restitution of
money paid on the stated ground that it was paid by mistake of law
and not of fact, that the circumstances may have been such that resti-
tution would have been denied even though the money had been paid
by mistake of fact instead of mistake of law. When a court is con-
vinced that restitution should not be decreed, in the pressure of work
it is likely to seize on the first plausible rule that comes handy; and
the reader surely well knows how handy the "mistake of law" rule
has become.6
1 Background material is available in the following sources: RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTrUTON §§ 1-2, 6-55 (1937) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT];
AzmIEcAN LAW INSTITUTE, CALIFoRNIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION (1940); 3 A. CoRINl, CONTRACTS § 617 (rev. ed. 1960); R. Gorr
& G. JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 61-139 (1966); W. KEENER, QUASI-CON-
TRACT, 26-158 (1893); 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1580-93 (rev. ed. 1937);
F. WOoDWARD, QUASI-CONTRACT §§ 10-44 (1913) [hereinafter cited as WooD-
WARD]; 70 C.J.S. Payment §§ 156-57 (1951); 38 CAL. JUR. 2d Payment §§ 59-69
(1957); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 949 (1928) (right to recover money voluntarily paid
with full knowledge of facts but under a misapprehension as to legal rights
and obligations); Annot., 63 A.L.R. 1346 (1929) (recovery back of public
money paid by mistake); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 649 (1933) (good faith in receiving
payment under mistake of fact as affecting its recovery); 40 A.L.R.2d 997
(1955) (what constitutes change of position by payee so as to preclude re-
covery of payment made under mistake).
2 Thurston, Recent Developments in Restitution: 1940-1947, 45 Micu. L.
REv. 935 (1947).
3 WOODWARD § 7.
4 E.g., 70 C.J.S. Payment § 157, at 367 (1951).
5 E.g., id. § 156, at 362-63.
6 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 617 at 756 (rev. ed. 1960).
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Origin of the Rule
The origin of the distinction between mistakes of fact and law as
applied to money payments is found in the 1802 English case of
Bilbie v. Lumley.7 Lord Ellenborough stated that "every man must
be taken to be cognizant of the law."" Woodward saw this as a
misapplication of the criminal law principle ignorantia juris non
excusat,9 and concluded that the distinction was unsound:
The maxim has no proper application ... to the case of one who
has done no wrong and who seeks not to inflict a loss upon an-
other ....
a . But the courts in England and America have long conceded
that money paid under mistake of fact, in circumstances which make
its retention inequitable, may be recovered; and there appears to be
no reason to fear that the excuse of ignorance of the law would prove
a greater temptation to the unscrupulous or a more effective weapon
of injustice.' 0
The Restatement of Restitution states the general rule: "Except as
otherwise stated in §§ 46-55, a person who, induced thereto solely by
mistake of law, has conferred a benefit upon another to satisfy in
whole or in part an honest claim of another to the performance given,
is not entitled to restitution.""
Applicable California Cases and Statutes
The operation of the rule in California will be examined first by
reference to the mistake of fact statute and cases, second by examina-
tion of the modification worked by the mistake of law statute, and
finally by reference to the mistake of law cases. It is necessary to
deal with the statutes and cases in this manner as the mistake of
fact cases state most clearly the mistake of law rule.1
2
Effect of Civil Code Section 1577
California Civil Code section 1577 provides:
Mistake of fact is a mistake, not caused by the neglect of a legal duty
on the part of the person making the mistake, and consisting in:
1. An unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past or
present, material to the contract; or,
2. Belief in the present existence of a thing material to the con-
tract, which does not exist, or in the past existence of such a thing,
which has not existed.
7 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (K.B.).
s Id. at 449.
9 Ignorance of the law is no excuse.
10 WooDwARW § 36, at 57-58.
11 RESTATEMENT § 45. The sections cited as exceptions indicate the extent
to which the rule has been judicially modified: § 46, satisfaction of non-
existent obligation, when restitution granted; § 47, payment upon a void
agreement; § 48, failure of purpose; § 49, gratuitous transactions; § 50, mis-
take as to size of grantor's interest; § 51, mistake as to the legal effect of
grant; § 52, purchase of nonexistent interest; § 53, services and improvements;
§ 54, performance of another's duty or discharge of lien against his property;
§ 55, benefit obtained by fraud or mistake.
12 See, e.g., Aebli v. Board of Education, 62 Cal. App. 2d 706, 145 P.2d
601 (1944).
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The effect of this section is to render an underlying contract
voidable and subject to rescission under section 1689 of the Civil
Code. Adjudication of rescission includes the possibility of restitu-
tion: "The aggrieved party shall be awarded complete relief, includ-
ing restitution of benefits, if any, conferred by him as a result of
the transaction .... -1
Aebli v. Board of Education 4 involved overpayments made to
school teachers. The city of San Francisco had adopted a salary
schedule, the amount of the salary being determined by the number
of years of service. The mistaken overpayments were discovered
after an audit, and the board of education began to deduct from the
salaries of the teachers the overpayments which were not barred by
the statute of limitations. The teachers then brought this action to
challenge the reductions and to recover those deductions that had
already been made.
The court affirmed the right of the board of education to recover
the overpayments: "The legal doctrine upon which the board based
its action in charging back the overpayments, and now justifies that
action is that of mistake. The law recognizes and deals with two
kinds of mistake, -that of law and that of fact. As a general rule
mistake of law is of no legal consequence, just as ignorance of the
law is no excuse."'15 California has thus perpetuated the error of
Bilbie v. Lumley. The court went on to discuss mistake of fact:
"Mistake of fact, however, as a general rule furnishes a good ground
for relief. Moreover, the mistake need not be mutual, or known to or
shared by the party receiving the money. Money paid under mistake
of fact may be recovered back however negligent the person making
the payment may have been unless the payment has caused such a
change in the position of the other party that it would be unjust to
require him to refund."'16
The court declined to state whether the mistake was one of law or
of fact, rather it was said to be a close question.1 7  The court
placed its decision on a qualification of the mistake of law rule,
namely that money paid out by mistake of the government or any
agency of the government, whether the mistake be one of law or fact,
may be recovered. The justification given for the exception was that
the money paid was public money, it was held in trust, and the payor
was unauthorized to make overpayments. While the case reaches
the correct result, it does so without an express statement of the
underlying basis for the decision, namely unjust enrichment. That
this is the basis is partially seen in the statement that the payment
may be recovered however negligent the person making the payment
may have been.' s
13 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1692.
14 62 Cal. App. 2d 706, 145 P.2d 601 (1944).
1r Id. at 724, 145 P.2d at 610.
16 Id. at 724-25, 145 P.2d at 610.
17 Id.
Is Id. at 725, 145 P.2d at 610; RESTATEmENT § 1; WooDwARw § 7; see, e.g.,
Fox v. Monahan, 8 Cal. App. 707, 709, 97 P. 765 (1908): "The action for money
had and received will lie wherever it appears that the defendant has received
money which in equity and good conscience he should pay to the plaintiff."
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American Oil Service, Inc. v. Hope Oil Co.19 was an action in
which a buyer and seller sought declaratory relief to determine their
rights. Involved were overpayments made on the part of the buyer
resulting from oversights of the buyer's bookkeeper. The defendant
maintained that there could be no recovery as this was a mistake of
law, and not of fact, but that if it was a mistake of fact, he had
changed his position so that it would be inequitable for a recovery to
be allowed. The court defined mistake of law in the following man-
ner: "A mistake of law occurs where a person is truly acquainted
with the existence or nonexistence of facts, but is ignorant of, or
comes to an erroneous conclusion as to their legal effect .... A
payment made by reason of a wrong construction of the terms of a
contract is made under a mistake of law."20
The court allowed recovery, holding that the mistake was one of
fact, the error being an oversight, and that there was no change of
position sufficient to make the recovery inequitable.2 1
Effect of Civil Code Section 1578
Before considering the mistake of law cases it is necessary to
consider the effect of section 1578 of the Civil Code, and to consider
the role that the volunteer policy plays in the right to restitution.
California Civil Code section 1578 provides:
Mistake of law constitutes a mistake, within the meaning of this ar-
ticle, only when it arises from:
1. A misapprehension of the law by all parties, all supposing
that they knew and understood it, and all making substantially the
same mistake as to the law; or,
2. A misapprehension of the law by one party, of which the
others are aware at the time of the contracting, but which they do not
rectify.
The mistake found in subsection 2 contains an element of fraud
which affords an obvious ground of relief.22 The mistake discussed
in the first clause is the type with which this note is concerned. The
effect of this section is similar to that of section 1577.23 The under-
lying contract is made voidable and subject to rescission.24 Adjudica-
tion of rescission includes the possibility of restitution.25 The mod-
ification which the statute makes is that it allows rescission and res-
titution where the mistake of law was mutual; its weakness is that
it confines relief to such a case.
Gregory v. Clabrough's Executor2 6 is cited by Professor Corbin as
a case which applies section 1578.27 The proceeds of a crop grown on
mortgaged land were mistakenly paid by the mortgagor to the mort-
gagee on the advice of the mortgagor's attorney. The mistake was
made in the interpretation of the mortgage which purported to cover
19 233 Cal. App. 2d 822, 44 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1965).
20 Id. at 830, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
21 Id. at 831, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
22 WOODWARD § 39, at 62.
23 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
24 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.
25 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1692.
26 129 Cal. 475, 62 P. 72 (1900).
27 See, e.g., 3 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 617, at 755 n.52 (rev. ed. 1960).
1228 [Vol. 19
May 1968] MONEY PAID UNDER MISTAKE OF LAW
all rents, issues and profits. The court found that the mistake arose
from a mutual misapprehension of the law, and stated that in such a
case it would imply a promise to repay the money.28 It should be
noted that this case did not involve a unilateral mistake of law. In
other words, where the mistake is mutual, and therefore within the
scope of section 1578, the right to restitution is present, just as it
would have been had the mistake been one of fact.29
It is clear that in both cases, where the mistake was one of fact,
or where the mistake of law was mutual, the basis for recovery is
unjust enrichment: 0 "[I]t is just for one who has benefited by the
mistake of another to return what he has received, except where
he is entitled to the benefit of his bargain or where there are other
circumstances which would make restitution inequitable . . . 1
Nevertheless, the effect of section 1578 is that it confines relief to
those cases where there was a mutual mistake of law.
Mistake of Law
In the mistake of law cases it is often difficult to determine the
exact basis on which the court rests its decision. This is due in part
to the volunteer policy which is embodied in the Restatement of
Restitution section 2: "A person who officiously confers a benefit
upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor." This section
amounts to a qualification of section 1: "A person who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make resti-
tution to the other." When read together the two sections indicate
that the enrichment principle provides for restitution only when the
enrichment is unjust, and that the volunteer policy is a factor of con-
sequence in determining if the enrichment is unjust.32  It is sub-
mitted that one of the factors used to determine if the payment was
voluntary, and hence not recoverable, is whether the mistake was
one of law or of fact.83
The joint operation of the volunteer policy and the mistake of
law policy is illustrated in the case of Myers v. City of Calipatria.3 4
Myers had been serving the city as its elected clerk. He was later
appointed city attorney; the same instrument which appointed him
provided that the city should be at no expense for any deputy clerks
so long as Myers was city attorney. Nevertheless he paid out of his
own money the salaries of certain deputies. In this action the plain-
tiff alleged that he had paid the money for the use and benefit of
the city.
The court denied recovery, finding that the payments were volun-
tary; and that even if the order, which stated that the city was to
28 129 Cal. at 478, 62 P. at 73.
29 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1577, and text accompanying note 13 supra.
30 Note 18 supra.
31 RESTATE M T, at 179.
32 See Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred without Request, 19
VAw. L. REv. 1183, 1183-84 (1966).
33 See Bucknall v. Story, 46 Cal. 589 (1873); Draper v. Grant, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 566, 205 P.2d 399 (1949); Myers v. City of Calipatria, 140 Cal. App.
295, 35 P.2d 377 (1934); Thresher v. Lopez, 52 Cal. App. 219, 198 P. 419 (1921).
34 140 Cal. App. 295, 35 P.2d 377 (1934).
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be at no expense for clerks, were void, that of itself would not consti-
tute a ground of relief. The court quoted35 at length from an earlier
California case, Brumagim v. Tillinghast:3 6 "It is the compulsion or
coercion under which the party is supposed to act which gives him
the right to relief. If he voluntarily pay an illegal demand, know-
ing it to be illegal, he is of course entitled to no consideration; and
if he voluntarily pay such demand in ignorance or misapprehension
of the law respecting its validity, he is in no better position, for it is
against the highest policy to permit transactions to be opened upon
grounds of this character. 3 7
A second example of the interrelation of the two policies is
found in the case of Bucknall v. Story.38 It was an action to recover
a sum of money paid under protest for an assessment made on the
plaintiff's property. The assessment was void in that it was made to
a person who had no interest in the land. In order to prevent the
threatened judicial sale of his land, the plaintiff paid the assessment.
The court held that where one makes a payment under a misappre-
hension of the law the payment is deemed voluntary, and cannot be
recovered back. The plaintiff was held to the knowledge that the
assessment was void, and that any threatened sale would have been
ineffective to give a purchaser even a color of title.39 This was the
misapprehension of law which rendered the plaintiff's payment volun-
tary and not recoverable.
The net effect of the volunteer policy and the mistake of law
policy operating in conjunction is the denial of restitution. It is not
readily apparent if Myers or Bucknall could have been decided on the
basis of the volunteer policy alone. It is submitted that in this area
the two policies coalesce, with the result that if a person has made a
unilateral mistake of law, it is easy to characterize him as a volun-
teer, and thus have an additional reason to deny recovery.40
There is but one California case which rests squarely on the rule
of money paid under mistake of law. Christy v. Sullivan4' was de-
cided after the enactment of Civil Code section 1578, but does not
refer to the statute. While the report of the case is very brief, it
appears that the plaintiff had purchased county warrants which did
not constitute a valid charge on the county treasury. The authority
of the treasurer to issue notes was limited to a certain dollar amount
which had been exceeded. The court disposed of the case with a brief
statement that the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat applied.42
35 Id. at 299, 35 P.2d at 379.
36 18 Cal. 265 (1861).
37 Id. at 271.
38 46 Cal. 589 (1873).
89 Id. at 599.
40 "[W]here money is paid with full knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances on which it is demanded, or with the means of such knowledge, it
cannot be recovered back on the ground that the party supposed he was not
bound in law to pay it, when in truth he was not. 'He shall not be permitted'
said the court, 'to allege his ignorance of the law, and it shall be considered
a voluntary payment.'" Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, 271 (1861); see,
e.g., cases cited note 33 supra.
41 50 Cal. 337 (1875).
42 Id. at 339.
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Critique of the State of the Law
The impression that one is left with as to restitution for money
paid under mistake of law is that California, while paying lip service
to the rule in cases which allow recovery either on the ground that
the mistake was one of fact,43 or that the mistake was made by a gov-
ernment agency,44 in reality has the rule in form and not in sub-
stance. Christy v. Sullivan45 alone can be said to rest on mistake of
law, but it is a weak case for supporting the rule in that it makes no
mention of Civil Code section 1578, and in that its brevity makes
analysis difficult. Myers v. City of Calipatria46 and Bucknall v.
Story47 most likely could have been justified on the basis of the vol-
unteer policy alone.
The underlying basis for restitution in the mistake of fact cases
is unjust enrichment.48 It is submitted that the enrichment is no less
unjust when the mistake is one of law. The cases which follow illus-
trate two positions concerning relief for a payment made under mis-
take of law.
Payne v. Witherbee Sherman & Co.,49 a New York case, was an
action to recover the balance due for electrical power furnished by
the plaintiff power company to the defendant. The defendant,
having discovered that overpayments had been made for a 3-year
period, counterclaimed for the excess paid. The trial court dismissed
the plaintiff's action, and awarded judgment on the counterclaim,
finding that the money had been paid under mistake. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the trial court's finding that
the overpayment was made by mistake was insufficient to allow a
recovery as payment made under mistake of law could not be re-
covered. 50
In contrast to Payne, Connecticut has, by judicial decision, allowed
recovery for payments made under mistake of law. The rationale for
allowing such recovery is expressed in the recent case of Ficken v.
Edward's, Inc.51 The defendant, a subcontractor, was unable to obtain
payment from an insolvent contractor, and sought payment from the
owner of the building. The owner made the payments in the mis-
taken belief that the subcontractor had the right to a mechanic's lien,
when in fact no such right attached as the owner had paid the con-
tractor in full. The court allowed the owner to recover the payments,
and found its reason in the language of an earlier Connecticut case,
Northrop's Executor v. Graves:52  "When money is paid by one, un-
der mistake of his rights and his duty, and which he was under no
43 See, e.g., American Oil Serv., Inc. v. Hope Oil Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 822,
44 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
44 See, e.g., Aebli v. Board of Education, 62 Cal. App. 2d 706, 145 P.2d 601
(1944), discussed in text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
45 50 Cal. 337 (1875).
46 140 Cal. App. 295, 35 P.2d 377 (1934).
47 46 Cal. 589 (1873).
48 Note 18 supra.
49 200 N.Y. 572, 93 N.E. 954 (1911).
50 Id. at 576, 93 N.E. at 956.
51 23 Conn. Supp. 378, 183 A.2d 924 (1962).
52 19 Conn. 548 (1848).
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legal or moral obligation to pay, and which the recipient has no
right in good conscience to retain, it may be recovered back in an
action of indebitatus assumpsit, whether such mistake be one of
law or fact .... The mind no more assents to the payment made
under a mistake of law, than if made under a mistake of the facts; in
both alike the mind is influenced by false motives."53
Statutory Relief
The present rule in California would not allow a recovery to be
had in a case similar to Ficken unless the court were to find that the
mistake was mutual. It is submitted that the result should not turn
on whether the mistake was mutual or unilateral, rather that the true
basis for a recovery lies in the principle of unjust enrichment, and
the enrichment is no less unjust where the mistake is one of law.
It is therefore recommended that the California statute which
deals with mistake of law be changed so as to allow recovery for
mistake of law. The experience of New York should prove helpful in
this regard, as New York has enacted a statute dealing with relief
against mistake of law on the recommendation of the New York Law
Revision Commission.54 In essence, their recommendation was that
the arbitrary rule which distinguished between mistake of fact and
law be abrogated since it was found to be without sound basis. This
would allow the courts the freedom to develop a general rule as to
mistake, and would avoid the unjust enrichment which is so apparent
in the Payne v. Witherbee Sherman & Co.55 case. The statute which
they recommended was enacted in 1942,56 and now reads:
When relief against a mistake is sought in an action or by
way of counterclaim, relief shall not be denied because the
mistake was one of law rather than one of fact.57
It is respectfully recommended that a statute similar to the above
be enacted in California. Given that the underlying basis for resti-
tution is unjust enrichment, the only manner in which relief for mis-
take can be consistently applied lies in such a statute.
Browning E. Marean*
53 Id. at 554.
54 1942 N.Y. LAW REvisioN COMm'N, REPORTS 27-67.
55 200 N.Y. 572, 93 N.E. 954 (1911).
56 Ch. 558, § 112-f [1942] N.Y. Laws 1369.
"57 N.Y. Civ. PaAc. LAW § 3005 (McKinney 1963).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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